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Abstract 
When Paula asked me to be the keynote speaker at this conference, I naturally wanted to pick a big, 
important topic that was relevant to consumer researchers, you, the audience. I am working on three big 
topics at the moment, between editions of the Rossiter and Percy textbook. One topic is marketing 
knowledgewhat it is and how we can test it. I have a large ARC grant for that one. A second topic is a new 
procedure for the measurement of marketing constructs-a replacement for the narrow Churchill 
procedure that everyone seems to follow. Some of you have seen working paper versions of this and I 
hope it will be published in a major marketing journal soon. The third topic, the one I have chosen, is 
certainly a big topic and one that has been on my mind for some time, and that is: which theoretical 
perspective is best for studying and doing research in consumer behaviour? The title refers to three forms 
of behaviourism-eognitive, emotional, and hard-core. This is deliberate, because I think we are all 
behaviourists in some form or other in that the dependent variable that we try to describe, explain and 
predict is the behaviour or behaviours of consumers. Most of us are also philosophically behaviourists, 
although there might be a few relativists, existentialists, and even just plain hedonists out there. However, 
no consumer researcher whom I know, with the single exceptioq of Gordon Foxall in England, is a hard-
core behaviourist, or what is called in psychology a radical behaviourist. Radical behaviourism denies the 
existence of mental events, such as attitudes, or at least refuses to accord them explanatory status. B. F. 
Skinner was of course the ultimate radical behaviourist, describing thinking, a main part of what we would 
now call cognition, in behavioural terms as "inner speech," as had John B. Watson earlier. This is to be 
distinguished from methodological behaviourism, which allows mental events but prefers the recording of 
observable behaviour, ratherthan, say, the elicitation ofself-reports, as theway ofstudying them. It is a pity 
that we don't have more radical behaviourists among consumer researchers, because this perspective, as 
we shall see, has certain advantages, one of them parsimony, which is a refreshing change from the 
"kitchen sink" approach favoured by . many cognitive behaviourists. 
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KEYNOTE AnDRESS
CognHive, Emotional, and Hard-Core Behaviourism as Theoretical Paradigms for Consumer
Behaviour
John R. Rossiter, University of Wol1ongong, Australia
When Paula asked me to be the keynote speaker at this
conference, I naturally wanted to pick a big, important topic that
was relevant to consumer researchers, you, the audience. I am
working on three big topics at the moment, between editions of the
Rossiter and Percy textbook. One topic is marketing knowledge-
what it is and how we can test it. I have a large ARC grant for that
one. A second topic is a new procedure for the measurement of
marketing constructs-a replacement for the narrow Churchill
procedure that everyone seems to follow. Some of you have seen
working paper versions of this and I hope it will be published in a
major marketing journal soon. The third topic, the one I have
chosen, is certainly a big topic and one that has been on my mind for
some time, and that is: which theoretical perspective is best for
studying and doing research in consumer behaviour?
The title refers to three forms of behaviourism-eognitive,
emotional, and hard-core. This is deliberate, because I think we are
all behaviourists in some form or other in that the dependent
variable that we try to describe, explain and predict is the behaviour
or behaviours of consumers. Most of us are also philosophically
behaviourists, although there might be a few relativists,
existentialists, and even just plain hedonists out there. However, no
consumer researcher whom I know, with the single exceptioq of
Gordon Foxall in England, is a hard-core behaviourist, or what is
called in psychology a radical behaviourist. Radical behaviourism
denies the existence of mental events, such as attitudes, or at least
refuses to accord them explanatory status. B. F. Skinner was of
course the ultimate radical behaviourist, describing thinking, a
main part of what we would now call cognition, in behavioural
terms as "inner speech," as had John B. Watson earlier. This is to be
distinguished from methodological behaviourism, which allows
mental events but prefers the recording of observable behaviour,
ratherthan, say, the elicitation ofself-reports, as the way ofstudying
them. It is a pity that we don't have more radical behaviourists
among consumer researchers, because this perspective, as we shall
see, has certain advantages, one of them parsimony, which is a
refreshing change from the "kitchen sink" approach favoured by .
many cognitive behaviourists.
What I propose to do in this talk is point out unique advantages
of each perspective-eognitive, emotional, and behaviourist-but
also their limitations as a total perspective. I will then argue the
necessity ofa combined perspective for the theoretical paradigm of
consumer behaviour and show how this might be achieved.
THE COGNITIVE PERSPECTIVE
By "cognitive" I mean beliefs of various kinds. Some may
think that this is too narrow a label for cognition but I would argue,
following Bertrand Russell and, later, psychologists such as Robert
Wyer, that all perceptions, attitudes, evaluations and the like are
instances of beliefs. Moreover, as Rossiter and Bellman, in a 1999
paperin theJournal ofCurrentIssues andResearch inAdvertising,
pointed out, there are basically just two kinds of beliefs, IS A
beliefs, as in brand awareness responses, such as "Coke is a cola,"
and HAS beliefs, as in brand attribute responses, such as "Coke has
caffeine." Iwill further assume thatbeliefs are conscious responses,
not subconscious, although they do not have to be covertly spoken
as Skinner's inner speech would require; they just have to be
"thought."
This emphasis on people's beliefs as the main cause of their
actions has been favoured widely. It is, of course, by far the
dominant approach in consumer behaviour, and one type ofbelief,
the HAS belief of "attitude," has overwhelmed all others as an
explanatory variable. The beliefs approach is reflected in the
popular viewpoint in marketing that what counts is "customers'
perceptions, not reality." The beliefs approach is also the dominant
one in health behaviour research, an important and growing field of
consumer behaviour. Most researchers in that field uses Strecher
and Rosenstock's 1997 Health BeliefModel, or a version ofit. And,
as an example of the absolutely current influence of the beliefs
approach, one has only to glance through the special issue of
Marketing Letters in 1999 devoted to consumer choice behaviour.
Every author in that issue, and every article, takes abeliefs perspective
as t!le theoretical paradigm.
The unique advantage of the beliefs approach is that it is so
obviously correct. Beliefs are the main causal variable in explaining
most consumerbehaviours. Ifour explanationofconsumer behaviour
had to be limited to one sufficient cause (which ofcourse it doesn't),
beliefs would be that cause. Not only are a high-involvement
consumer decisions dependent on beliefs but so too are low-
involvement consumer decisions because consumers' simplifying
heuristics are, after all, beliefs.
The main limitationofthe beliefs approach is that the proportion
ofconsumer behaviours that are determined by beliefs aloneis quite
small. There are even some consumer behaviours in which beliefs
do not appear to playa role at all. We will meet an important class
of these, discussed below in the behaviourist perspective, when
considering the question of whether behaviour 1 can directly cause
behaviour 2.
There is also an important criticism of the entire cognitive
perspective that I would like to express here (although I am
certainly not the first to voice this criticism). It is actually two
somewhat related criticisms. In the first place, cognitive theorists
are too eager to invent extra and superfluous mental constructs. Jim
Bettman's classic 1979 book on consumer information processing
provides many examples ofthis. Almost every observable consumer
behaviour had to have a mental counterpart, such as a "sensory input
analyser" ora"choicesubroutine." Cognitive theorists in psychology
are not immunefrom this criticism; one has only to pickup any issue'
of the Journal ofExperimental Psychology over the past 10 years
to find examples ofcomplexmodels in which the observed behaviour
is "explained" by some newly postulated internal mechanism.
Skinner has long ridiculed this tendency in cognitive theory,
suggesting that there mustbe, also inside, alittle man, orhomunculus,
to push all the buttons to make these mechanisms work! I detect a
similar tendency in contemporary models ofconsumer behaviour to
simply throw extra variables into the "black box" because it is so
easy to do so.
This sets up the second criticism. It is easy to draw arrows
between variables or, worse, between boxes of variables and think
that you therefore have a causal theory. Cognitive theorists are
notoriously bad at providing functional explanations of the
relationships between the variables and many theorists, consumer
researchers especially, do not seem to think it necessary to do so.
Symptomatic of this is the popularity of the verb "impact" to
describe the hypothesised effect of one variable upon another.
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Sounds great, and sounds pretty serious, .as in an automobile
collision, but what does it mean? Impact is an effect, not a cause,
despite the deplorable tendency to turn the word into an active verb,
and it masks any effort to come up with a causal explanation. It is
tempting to lay the blame for the decline in truly functional theories
of the causes of behaviour to the anti-mechanistic stance taken
against learning theories, which ruled in psychology for several
decades, by the leaders of the "cognitive revolution," notably
Miller, Galanter and Pribram (1960) in Plans and the Structure of
Behavior. In learning theories, some of which were decidedly
cognitive, such as those of Kurt Lewin and Edward Tolman, it was
imperative for the theorist to trace through the causal mechanism or
mechanisms-Pavlovian conditioning and operant learning would
be two well-known examples-showing them not just in a diagram
but carefully explaining and defending them in words. Most of the
cognitive theorists in consumer behaviour, and that's most of us
here, have lost this skill, this discipline, or in the case of the younger
ones, never acquired it.
THE EMOTIONAL PERSPECTIVE
By "emotional" I mean feeling-states of various types, posi-
tive and negative, often triggered by an abrupt stimulus change, that
can interfere with or enhance behaviour. Emotions probably cannot
occur without cognition, so there will inevitably be some overlap
with the cognitive perspective which was just discussed. How this
overlap takes place, functionally, I will address in the combined
perspective that concludes this talk. There is no doubt though, that
emotions contribute substantially to the explanation of behaviour
and that a purely cognitive account would not be adequate to
explain many consumer behaviours.
Most importantly, emotions energise behaviour. They usually
do this in the service ofmotives, as Rossiter and Percy have pointed
out in their grid theory. In contrast, emotions that occur "on their
own" usually lead simply to emotional thoughts or short-term
emotional behaviours, sometimes rash ones, that logically have
little to do with consumer behaviour, not even with "impulse"
purchasing. However, the residual arousal from these emotions can
have very big effects on consumer behaviours. I think the emotion-
produced arousal has much bigger, and more frequent, effects on
consumer behaviours in the real world than can ever be observed in
our student-subject academic laboratories. Zillmann's excitation-
transfer model, which was based on laboratory experiments before
ethics committees were invented, and then followed up with real-
world field experiments, supports this claim. The main feature of
excitation-transfer theory is that arousal persists after the event that
caused it, leading the person to attribute the feeling of excitement
to the next event, and thus to artificially energise it. For instance,
Zillmann demonstrated that intercourse among couples who had
that day or evening attended a sporting event, such as a football
game or an ice-hockey game, was significantly more likely to take
place if the teams' scores were close rather than one-sided and
boring. In a neat "crossover" field experiment, he further showed
that aggressive behaviour is more likely after watching an erotic
movie and even after simply watching an exciting one. (He was
careful in these experiments to select non-aggressive erotic movie
sequences and scenes from action movies that were non-violent,
such as James Bond-type daredevil stunts or car chases). Car chases
are not so far removed from what happens on Sydney roads every
day, including on the way to the supermarket. Reportedly, people
are feeling increased stress from all sources. They often go shop-
ping during or after the stressful event, and often to make major
purchases. It is pretty likely that residual arousal changes the
normal "rationality" that would be brought to these decisions and
perhaps makes the purchase more likely. These are serious types of
impulse purchases!
Anyway, I think you can see from this example the unique
contribution of the emotional perspective. Essentially, it forces us
to focus on other factors besides awareness, beliefs, and attitudes
that influence consumer decisions. These "other factors" are most
likely to be emotions and motivation. The emotional perspective
takes us out of laboratory or at least illuminates the limited environ-
ment of laboratory experiments.
Main problem with the emotional perspective is that academic
researchers, and practitioners, especially advertising practitioners,
have too readily and too sloppily embraced it. I should give some
examples of this.
One example is the aggressive advocacy by advertising prac-
titioners, advertising agencies particularly, of "emotional" ads as
being obviously superior to "rational" ads. Listening to these
people, it would appear that if your ad doesn't "bond" with every
individual it is aimed at, then the campaign will fail. I think they
mean slice-of-life TVcommercials, not emotional ads. Slice-of-life
commercials are the type that usually require huge production
budgets. All ads have an emotional component. I would argue, for
example, that a three-line classified ad for a used car can generate
a lot of emotion if you are in the market for a used car and are
therefore reading the ad. Accordingly to emotional advertising
advocates, a purely emotional ad would presumably be the best of
all and it would have to communicate without any cognitive
content. The closest thing I have seen to this would be Lemon
Ruski's one-second flash ads; you may have seen these on avante-
garde TV programs such as Sex and the City. Ironically, these ads
have a cognitive strategy behind them (specifically, the intended
formation of beliefs, such as that Lemon Ruski is suitable for
nightclubs, is Russian, is for drinkers ofboth genders, and so forth).
However, a recent experiment that I conducted with these one-
second ads suggests that they may only work via classical condi-
tioning, that is, by affect transfer. Very few ads are as cognitively
vacuous as these.
.Academic researchers working in the "emotional" area have
neglected to understand the dynamic nature of emotional states.
When rating a TV commercial, for instance, researchers provide
consumers with a list of the emotional adjectives that consumers
can tick to represent emotions that they might have felt while
watching and listening to the commercial. The inadequacy of this
approach is that the order-the sequence-in which the emotions
were experienced is critical. In a problem-solution commercial, to
give an example of just one type of advertising format, it is
important that the consumer experiences the negative emotion first,
strongly (when the problem is dramatised), followed by a mild
positive emotion (in conjunctionwith the solution demonstrated for
the advertised product). This is a classic negative reinforcement or,
more specifically, escape conditioning sequence, and it fits Rossiter
and Percy's problem-removal motive. To give another example,
this time employing positive emotion, the best emotional sequence
for a product advertised on the basis of the sensory gratification
motive is a neutral start, then a build-up to a crescendo finish; it is
extremely important that there not be any emotional flattening at the
end of the commercial as can happen with the insertion of a
corporate comment or a dealer tag (see Baumgartner et a1.'s study
in the Journal of Marketing Research, 1997). If you ask good
copywriters what they try to do in a TV commercial, or any form of
ad, as did Art Kover a few years ago in an article in the Journal of
Consumer Research, 1995, copywriters will say, in their own
words, that they try to achieve an emotion shift. Academic research-
ers working in advertising, and also many advertising pre-test
practitioners, seem to miss this entirely, by having consumers rate
the ad on isolated emotional adjectives. Emotions are inherently
dynamic phenomena, and they often reflect the operation of an
underlying motive. Our current models of emotions in marketing
are far too static, and "emotions are seen as almost trivial or
peripheral affect rather than as drivers or energisers of behaviour.
THE BEHAVIOURIST PERSPECTIVE
By "behaviourist" I mean, in this section of the paper, hard-
core, radical, behaviourism-with strict emphasis on external stimuli
and external, observable responses. Nothing "inside" the consumer
is allowed-no perceptions,no attitudes, no intentions-just measur-
ablestimuli "outthere" in the consumer's environment and measur-
able overt responses such as purchase. As I said, few consumer
behaviour theorists-probably only one, Gordon Foxall-is a radical
behilviourist, and even he may be coming around to my view, the
mediationist S-R view, which I will outline in the final section of
this talk.
The unique advantage of radical behaviourism is, of course,
parsimony. B.F. Skinner's theoretical explanation of behaviour,
apart from innately-released behaviour, has just three concepts: a
discriminative stimulus, a response, and a consequential stimulus in
the form of a reinforcer or punisher. There's a scary demonstration
of overspending induced by credit cards, a study by Richard
Feinberg published in the Journal ofConsumer Research in 1986.
This is recognisable as the operant learning or operant conditioning
paradigm. It may be noted that classical conditioning also has
essentially the same three concepts: the CS or "signalling" stimu-
lus, the response or CR, and a reinforcing or punishing stimulus, the
US, that, in classical conditioning, occurs before the response. The
US elicits an unconditional response, the DR, a variant of which
becomes the conditioned response. Both operant conditioning and
classical conditioning are extremely parsimonious as theories go.
I would like to take a few minutes to examine an apparently
even more parsimonious theory: that behaviour 1 can directly cause
behaviour 2, that is, that response 1 can cause response 2 without a
stimulus intervening. Those familiar with learning theory will
know that the fundamental unit is an S-R orR-S connection; you can
have chains of S-Rs but not two Ss or two Rs occurring together,
such as one response causing another response. However, in an
important study, which was in fact a meta-analysis of a large
number ofprevious studies, Ouellette and Wood, in thePsychologi-
cal Review, 1998, found that the best pr~dictor of behaviours that
occur daily or weekly in much the same context was the"past
frequency of the behaviour, not intention to perform the behaviour.
In contrast, the best predictor of infrequent behaviours that occur
every six months or so in varying contexts was indeed behavioural
intention, with past behaviour playing very little role. The obvi-
ously important take-away from the study is that it identifies the
conditions under which intentions are not a good predictor offuture
behaviour. This has been an issue that has perplexed consumer
researchers and indeed market researchers for a long time. How-
ever, the other implication of the study is just as intriguing: how can
past behaviour directly cause future behaviour? In their analysis,
the authors ruled out attitude and also attitude accessibility as the
intervening cause. That is, for regular, frequently-performed
behaviours, the next instance of that behaviour occurs without
recourse to attitude and without forming an intention to perform the
behaviour-it just occurs "automatically." Nevertheless, and herein
lies the explanation, I think, there is one event that occurs between
the past behaviour and the next occurrence of the behaviour, and
that is the stimulus context. All the regular behaviours take place in
much the same context, and this context is, of course, a stimulus.
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Thus, I would argue, we have not broken the stimulus-response
chain. This is not two responses occurring sequentially, one being
the cause of the other. In fact, the authors label the past behaviour
effect as "habit," and a learning theorists would know that habit
carries both a stimulus subscript and a response subscript. It is an S-
R concept, not simply an R concept.
There are two main reasons why the hard-core behaviourist
perspective has not been influential in consumer research. Whereas
it may be true that the explanation of an individual's current
behaviour can be found in his or her learning or conditioning
history, this history, for consumers, unlike, say, for a pigeon or a rat
(or Skinner's daughter!) raised in a laboratory, is simply impracti-
calor impossible to observe. Note, for instance, that the studies
reviewed by Ouelette and Wood asked people to report the fre-
quency oftheir past behaviour-they did not actually observe those
past behaviours. Similarly, in consumer research, it is much easier
to ask people about their current attitude than to observe and
measure all the experiences that may have led to it and then infer
what that attitude must be.
A second problem with the behaviourist approach, not unre-
lated to the first, is that different people so often have different
responses to the same stimulus situation. For instance, as Rich
Yalch reported in a study in the Journal ofConsumer Research in
1978, obese and normal-weight people respond differently to food
stimuli, with obese people responding positively if they have eaten
recently and normal-weight people responding neutrally or even
negatively; so, if you want to resist impulse purchases when food
shopping, watch when you eat! Pokemon card characters that
fascinate children are pretty boring and meaningless to most adults.
Clothing styles that interest women are rather uninteresting to
(most) men. And so it goes with the many response differences
across cultures as well. One can appeal to differential learning
histories in an attempt to explain these differences, although it is
likely that biology also plays a part, but it is much easier to posit
internal events such as perceptions (the beliefs perspective) to
account for them.
. In the latter connection, even though internal events seem
conceptually useful and certainly efficient, there is a salutary
caution of Occam's razor that the behaviourist perspective im-
poses: and that is to not invent constructs beyond necessity. We
want explanatory models containing the minimum number of
constructs to do the job.
COMBINED PERSPECTIVE: S-R MEDlATIONIST
My own perspective, and the one I think that is most valid for
consumer behaviour, is the S-R mediationist perspective (see
especially Charles Osgood's version, based on Hull-Spence
behaviour theory). Most consumer behaviour theorists, judging
from their published work, are "would-be" mediationists, in that
they allow mental events to intervene between external stimuli and
observable responses. However, they are not S-R mediationists. It
is not enough to put variables in the black box and draw boxes
around them and perhaps arrows between them. What is needed is
an operational specification of the functional relationship between
the variables. (Interestingly, the best way of determining the nature
of the functional relationship is through qualitative research, but
that's another talk in itself.) In S-R mediationism, the basic
functional unit is S-r -Sg- R. The little rg and the little Sg are
internal events. The littFe rg IS a fractional anteaating goal response.
It is an internal representation of the final response, the big R. The
fractional antedating goal response can be an attention response, an
emotional response, a perception or belief response, and so forth
(thus this model incorporates the beliefs perspective and the
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emotional perspective that I talked about earlier). The little Sg is the
really neatmechanism. It is aresponse-produced stimulus, produced
~utomatically by the rg' This might be, for instance, a sensation, an
unage, or a thought. It is this second, internal stimulus that serves
as the discriminative stimulus, in the operant paradigm, or the
signalling stimulus, in the Pavlovian paradigm, for the external
response (R) to bemade.There is afunctional relationship identifiable
between each stimulus and response in the chain, and the model
allows us to explain how different individuals can have different
external responses to the same external stimulus. That is, people
learn different little rg's to the external stimulus; these have their
own internal stimulus consequences, the little Sg'S, which are also
correspondingly different; and thereby different external responses
are observed.
A much more elaborate version of S-R mediationist theory is
required to account for most types of consumer behaviour.
Essentially, the little internal r's and s's are elaborated into several
constructs or intervening variables. A powerful and parsimonious
yet comprehensive model can be derived from Hull-Spence
behaviour theory. It is totally functional; it allows for beliefs and
emotions; and it still remains true to the behaviourist, though not the
hard-core behaviourist, aim in that it is an S-R theory.
A simplified equation from Hull-Spence theory is E=(D+K)
H, where E is behaviour potential, D is drive, K is incentive, and H
is habit strength, the learned internal response in the situation (an rg,
in effect). The important aspect of this model, which differs from
the outdated versions of the original Hullian model that one
sometimes sees in consumer behaviour textbooks, is the additive
term (D+K). This says that learned habits (response tendencies) can
be energised either by a preexisting drive state, such as hunger or,
more cognitively, need for achievement, or with no drive operating
but when an incentive is presented. This is why, to give a simple
example, a chocolate eclair looks tempting even when you're not
hungry. It is actually a very cleverway to account for a phenomenon
that was a big dilemma for learning theorists, that of latent learning.
How could, for instance, a satiated rat learn a maze, if the normal
food or water reinforcement wasn't working? Yet they do learn.
There is enough aversion in the maze to provide the drive function
(the rat wants to get out). This causes exploratory behaviour without
reinforcement. When the same rat is put back in the maze, this time
hungry, it will run the maze speedily and correctly, showing that it
did indeed learn the habit on the earlier occasion. This type of
experiment demonstrates that reinforcement is not necessary for
learning, which greatly pleased the cognitive theorists, but on the
other hand it rapidly improves performance, which I think fits our
observations of work behaviour as wen as consumer behaviour.
The full version of the Hull-Spence model has several other
internal constructs (not too many, as we want it to remain
parsimonious). These constructs were behind the communication
effects that were proposed by Rossiter and Percy, which have been
quite widely adopted. There are five of these. Category need
corresponds to the Hullian drive construct, D. Brand awareness
corresponds to a construct caned stimulus intensity, S. Brand
attitude corresponds to habit strength, H. Brand purchase intention
corresponds approximately to incentivemotivation, K. And purchase
facilitation corresponds to (the absence of) conditioned inhibition,
I, which subtracts from drive.
The details ofparticularS-Rmediationist models, andparticular
versions can be built, are less important than the discipline that they
bring to our thinking about how to explain and predict consumer
behaviour. They do two main things, in summary. Firstly, they
permit a combined account of the causality of consumer behaviour
with both cognitive and emotional explanatory variables (for
example, Zillmann's eXcitation-transfer theory that I talked about
is basedon the generalised drive variable, D; and cognitive response
theory, originated by the Ohio State psychologists, then made
famous by Petty and Cacioppo, and amazingly invented again
without attribution by the research company Research Intemational,
who patented the name, is based on little rg, the fractional antedating
goal response). Secondly, S-R mediationist models force us to
become functional theorists rather than wishy-washy box and
arrow or correlational theorists that the hard sciences look down
upon. I am hopeful that we can raise our game.
Thank you very much.
